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CORPORATE AND INSTITUTIONAL ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATIONS AS WORK PRODUCT PURSUANT TO
THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
William Todd Benson*
I. INTRODUCION
If the magnitude of the mishap so warrants, many businesses im-
mediately call their insurance adjuster or other accident investiga-
tor. In some of the larger businesses, accident investigation and in-
surance have become in-house operations. This quick reflex toward
early fact investigation is prompted, in part, by a healthy respect
for the potentiality of claims arising out of the day to day conduct
of business affairs. When a suit against such company ultimately is
ified and discovery sought, an issue often arises concerning
whether early institutional investigations are "work product" for
purposes of the federal or Virginia rules of civil procedure. This
leads to the natural follow-up questions: What is the work product
rule? How should it be implemented? This article addresses these
two questions as they pertain to Virginia procedure.
The federal work product doctrine is currently found in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 1 Virginia's work product doctrine
is found in Rule 4:1(b)(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia.2 Virginia's pretrial discovery rules are Federal Rules 26
through 37 "verbatim so far as is consistent with Virginia prac-
tice."3 Indeed, the language of the two work product doctrines is
identical. Considerable more case law and commentary have been
devoted to the federal doctrine;4 thus, it provides the basis for
much of the discussion of the Virginia rule.
II. THE WORK PRODUCT RULE
What we know as Federal Rule 26(b)(3) developed through the
* A.B., Princeton University, 1976; J.D., T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Rich-
mond, 1982. Mr. Benson is an associate in the firm of Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent &
Chappell.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
2. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:1(b)(3).
3. W. H. BnYSON, NoTEs ON VIRGINI CIW. PROCEDURE 111 (1979).
4. As yet, there are no Supreme Court of Virginia decisions on Rule 4:1(b)(3). But see
Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 751 (1970) (discussing "good cause").
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merger of two separate but related concepts:' the rule in Hickman
v. Taylor6 and the "good cause" provision under the old Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 34.7
A. Hickman v. Taylor
The facts of this well-known case are stated briefly as follows:
On February 7, 1943, the tug "J.M. Taylor" sunk while towing a
barge across the Delaware River. Five of the nine crew members
were killed. Three days later, the tug owners and their underwrit-
ers employed a law firm to defend them against potential suits. A
public hearing on the accident was held before the United States
Steamboat Inspectors on March 4, 1943. Shortly thereafter, the tug
owners' retained lawyer privately interviewed the survivors and
took their statements. The survivors signed their statements on
March 29, 1943.
At the time the statements were taken, representatives of two of
the deceased crew members had been in contact with the tug own-
ers' lawyer. Ultimately, all claims were settled out of court except
the claim of the representatives of Hickman ("Hickman").
Whether Hickman was one of the claimants who had previous con-
tact with the defendants' lawyer is not disclosed in the reported
case. Hickman filed suit on November 26, 1943. In the course of
discovery, Hickman filed an interrogatory requesting any state-
ments made by any crew member of the "J.M. Taylor" in connec-
tion with its sinking. In upholding the attorney's refusal to honor
the request of this interrogatory the United States Supreme Court
based its decision on two primary considerations.
First, the Court sought to protect the mental impressions and
5. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1970).
6. 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (articulating a qualified protection against discovery for the work
product of attorneys).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (amended 1970). "Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore and upon notice to all other parties,. . . the court ... may [order discovery]." Id.
The current version is absent the good-cause language:
The [production] request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff
after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of
the summons and complaint upon that party. The request shall set forth the items to
be inspected either by individual item or by category, and describe each item and
category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time,
place, and manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 34(b). See also Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970).
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mental process of the attorney.8 The Court found that it is essen-
tial that an attorney be able to prepare his legal theories and plan
his strategies without undue and needless interference. The Court
also noted that an attorney's thoughts are reflected in "interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impres-
sions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible
ways."" Collectively, the Court referred to these items as "work
product". 10 The court went on to note that
[w]ere such materials open to an opposing counsel on mere demand,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be in his
own. . . The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing.
And the interests of the client and the cause of justice would be
poorly served."'
Although this aspect of the decision often comes to mind in consid-
eration of the Hickman case, it has been suggested that the
"mental process" import of the case has been diminished in light
of subsequent cases on the subject.12
The second, and arguably dominant, policy behind Hickman has
been described as the anti-indolence provision.13 The Court noted
that the plaintiff sought discovery of oral and written statements
of witnesses whose identities were well known to him and whose
availability appeared unimpaired and that this discovery was
sought as a matter of right. The Court held that such a demand
could not be made without a showing of necessity for the produc-
tion of this material or a demonstration that denial of production
8. Closely associated with this aspect of the holding was the fear that probing an attor-
ney's thoughts would harm the judicial process: "Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for
trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the
clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served." 329 U.S. at 511.
9. Id. It is important to point out that the Court implied that even "mere facts" are
indications of an attorney's thought process because "[p]roper preparation of a client's case
demands that he assemble information [and] sift what he considers to be the relevant from
the irrelevant facts. "Id.
I0. Id.
11. Id.
12. Note, Development In The Law-Discovery, 74 HAv. L. REv. 940, 1028 (1961).
13. State v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, -, 150 N.W.2d 387, 404 (1967). The policy
of the anti-indolence provision was to encourage individual research and investigation of a
matter and to discourage attorneys from using the work of their opponents to bypass their
own efforts.
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would cause undue hardship or injustice.14 The mere fact that the
materials were not privileged was not a sufficient reason to compel
production.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson addressed Hickman's
argument that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed
"to do away with the old situation where a lawsuit developed into
'a battle of wits between counsel.' "15 Justice Jackson rejected this
argument, noting that an inherent aspect of our common law sys-
tem is that trials proceed on an adversarial basis. Indeed, the Jus-
tice noted that free and open discovery of work product materials
14. No attempt was made to establish any reason why Fortenbaugh [the tug owner's at-
torney] should be forced to produce the written statements. There was only a naked,
general demand for these materials as of right and a finding by the District Court
that no recognizable privilege was involved. That was insufficient to justify discovery
under these circumstances and the court should have sustained the refusal of the tug
owners and Fortenbaugh to produce.
329 U.S. at 512.
We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production of written statements
and mental impressions contained in the files and mind of the attorney Fortenbaugh
without any showing of necessity or any indication or claim that denial of such pro-
duction would unduly prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case or cause him any
hardship or injustice....
[N]either Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with discovery contemplates production
under such circumstances .... Here is simply an attempt, without purported neces-
sity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and personal
recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his
legal duties. As such, it falls outside the arena of discovery ... Not even the most
liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the
mental impressions of an attorney.
329 U.S. at 509-10. Cf. Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 546, 172 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1970):
The mere assertion by affidavit that discovery is necessary for a movant to investi-
gate fully and prepare his case is clearly insufficient in a statement of good cause.
Holt v. The James Sheridan, 12 F.R.D. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Little Rock Basket Co., 14 F.R.D. 383 (E.D. Ark. 1953). Neither is good cause estab-
lished when the moving party has not shown a bona fide effort to obtain the informa-
tion by independent investigation. Goldner v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Sys., 13 F.R.D.
326 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
Accord, A.H. Robins Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Chan. No. G. 3321-2 (Rich. Cir. Ct.
February 19, 1981), reported in 6 Virginia Assoc. of Defense Attorneys Newsletter 1 (1981).
15. 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring). Subsequent courts have picked up on and
followed Jackson's sentiment. See, e.g., Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba,
54 F.R.D. 367, 373 (N.D. IMI. 1972) ("[T]he obligation of discovery imposed on parties gener-
ally ... [is] designed to insure that the fact finding process does not become reduced to
gamesmanship that rewards parties for hiring or obscuring potentially significant facts.").
However, Justice Jackson's retort is as applicable now as it was then: "But a common law
trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to
enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed
from the adversary." 329 U.S. at 516.
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without any showing of substantial need "put trials on a level even
lower than 'a battle of wits.' "16 This aspect of Hickman clearly
admonishes an attorney to do his own trial preparation. Opposing
counsel should not be required to turn over information unless and
until the party seeking discovery has made a good-faith effort to
acquire such information through other means. Furthermore, the
party seeking discovery is admonished to demonstrate that the re-
quested information is substantially necessary in the preparation
of his case.
B. "Good Cause" Under Old Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34
The old Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3417 required a showing
of "good cause" for the production of all documents and things
whether or not trial preparation was involved.18 By 1970, however,
it became obvious that many courts were applying two different
"good cause" tests."' "With respect to documents not obtained or
prepared with an eye to litigation, the decisions, while not uniform,
reflect[ed] a strong and increasing tendency to relate 'good cause'
to a showing that the documents [were merely] relevant to the sub-
ject matter of the action. ' 20 "As to trial-preparation materials,
however, the courts [were] increasingly interpreting 'good cause' as
requiring more than relevance." 21 In fact, "an overwhelming pro-
16. 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (amended 1970). See supra note 7.
18. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-
ery, 48 F.R.D. at 500.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1960); Connecticut Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Houdry Process Corp. v. Com-
monwealth Oil Refining Co., 24 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)).
21. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-
ery, 48 F.R.D. at 500. Some courts, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, applied
the "more than mere relevancy" test whether or not the requested information was prepared
in anticipation of litigation.
[C]ompelling the production of documents under Rule 34 can be extremely harras-
sing. Use of the weapon which this rule forges should not be permitted without more
than the easily satisfied test of relevancy. This is particularly true since the identity
of the witnesses can be readily discovered by Rule 33 interrogatories. Opposing coun-
sel then has the opportunity to interview these witnesses himself or take their deposi-
tions. If it should subsequently appear that there exists a special need to compel
disclosure of the statements themselves, this would undoubtedly satisfy the required
showing of good cause.
We are not unmindful that one important purpose of discovery is to disclose all
relevant and material evidence before trial in order that the trial may be an effective
method for arriving at the truth and not "a battle of wits between counsel." Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516, 67 S. Ct. 385, 396, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
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portion of the cases in which a special showing [was] required
[were] cases involving trial preparation materials."22
As noted by the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court on
the Reformation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts
were also split as to whether the "good cause" trial preparation
standard applied to preparatory work of non-lawyers. However, the
Committee found that with respect to information compiled by
non-lawyers, the growing trend in 1970 was "to read 'good cause' as
requiring inquiry into the importance of and need for the materials
as well as into alternative sources for securing the same
information."2
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)
In 1970, the current Federal Rule 26(b)(3) was created, and the
"good cause" language was deleted from Federal Rule 34. Apart
from trial preparation materials, discovery requests no longer re-
quired a showing beyond that of relevance and absence of
privilege.24
concurring); see Frost, The Ascertainment of Truth by Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 89
(1961). Doubtless, written statements of witnesses, if placed in the hands of opposing
counsel, could aid him in preparing his case because this would give him a specific
indication of the forthcoming testimony and a basis for impeachment if a witness
departed from his prior statements. There is also the possibility that counsel would
gain information opening up new areas for investigation before trial. However, these
considerations must have been before the Advisory Committee that drew up the
Rules and the Supreme Court when it adopted them. It is noteworthy that, while the
Advisory Committee in 1955 urged deletion of the good cause requirement, the Su-
preme Court did not act on the recommendation. See Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 965-67 (1961).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally construed, but they may
not be expanded by disregarding plainly expressed limitations. We are not prepared
to depart from the explicit language of Rule 34 when viewed in the context of the
entire discovery section. In holding that a demonstration that the desired materials
are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation does not by itself satisfy the good
cause requirement of Rule 34, we are joining every other Court of Appeals that has
considered this question. Hauger v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 216 F.2d 501
(7th Cir. 1954); Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 83 U.S. App. D.C. 239, 170 F.2d 811
(1948); see Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958); Williams v. Continental Oil
Co., 215 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1954); Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.
1950).
Guilford Nat'l Bank of Greensboro v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1962).
Accord, Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 751 (1970).
22. Proposed Admendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-





Prior to the 1970 amendments, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure made no provisions concerning "the production of documents
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial."2 5 Federal Rule
26(b)(3) was created in order to address "the controversial and
vexing problems" 26 arising out of the doctrines discussed above.
The new rule included three central points: 1) It codified the work-
product doctrine enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor;27 2) it ex-
panded the work-product doctrine so as to include information or
materials prepared by non-lawyers in anticipation of litigation;"
and 3) "good cause" was inserted as a requirement for the discov-
ery of an opponent's work product.2 9
III. VIRGINIA'S RULE 4:1(B)(3)
With the above understanding of the history of the federal work
product rule, Virginia's comparable work product rule, its intent
and effect, is examined.
A. Clear and Unambiguous Statutory Language Is to Be Given
Effect
The language of Rule 4:1(b)(3) is clear and unambiguous. It
states that documents and tangible evidence prepared in anticipa-
25. Id. at 499.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 500-02.
28. Id. at 502 ("Subdivision (b)(3) reflects the trend of the cases by requiring a special
showing, not merely as to materials prepared by an attorney, but also as to materials pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial by or for a party or any represen-
tative acting on his behalf."). See also A.H. Robins Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Chan. No.
G 3321-2 (Rich. Cir. Ct. February 19, 1981), reported in 6 Virginia Assoc. of Defense Attor-
neys Newsletter (1981):
It should be noted at this point that the protection for ordinary work products
extend under the Rule to documents prepared by or for the party's representative,
not just his attorney ... Therefore, the fact that the documents were prepared by
or for Aetna's computer experts or paraprofessionals is not in itself relevant as long as
the materials were prepared for trial or in anticipation of litigation.
Id. at 5.
29. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-
ery, 48 F.R.D. at 501.
On the other hand, the requirement of a special showing for discovery of trial prep-
aration materials reflects the view that each side's informal evaluation of its case
should be protected, that each side should be encouraged to prepare independently,
and that one side should not automatically have the benefit of the detailed prepara-
tory work of the other side.
Id. As this language so clearly demonstrates, "work product" is not limited to mental im-
pressions or thought processes.
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tion of litigation by or for a party or by or for a party's representa-
tive "including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, in-
surer, or agent" is not discoverable without a showing of
substantial need or undue hardship.30 When statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, it is to be given effect. This rule of law is
firmly entrenched in Virginia.31 If language is clear and unambigu-
ous, the courts will not resort to rules of construction.3 2 As force-
fully stated by the Supreme Court of Virginia on one occasion:
It is contended that the construction insisted upon by the plaintiff
in error is violative of the spirit or reason of the law. The argument
would seem to concede that the contention is within the letter of the
law. We hear a great deal about the spirit of the law, but the duty of
this court is not to make law, but to construe it; not to wrest its
letter from its plain meaning in order to conform to what is con-
ceived to be its spirit, in order to subserve and promote some princi-
ple of justice and equality which it is claimed the letter of the law
has violated. It is our duty to take the words which the legislature
has seen fit to employ and give to them their usual and ordinary
signification, and having thus ascertained the legislative intent, to
give effect to it, unless it transcends the legislative power as limited
by the Constitution. 33
It is clear, therefore, that, in Virginia, plain language is given ef-
fect. The fact that what is under consideration is a rule of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia rather than a statute enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly is immaterial. It is clear that the rules of court
authorized by statute 4 have the force and effect of law.35 Once
adopted, "[tihey become binding upon the litigants as well as upon
the court in the conduct of its proceeding."3 6
B. "In Anticipation of Litigation"
Statutes are to be construed according to the reasonable mean-
ing of the language employed.37 The clear language of Rule
30. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:1(b)(3).
31. See generally 17 Michie's Jur. Statutes § 34 (1979 and Cum. Supp. 1981).
32. Sanitation Comm'n v. Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 240 S.E.2d 819 (1978).
33. Saville v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 114 Va. 444, 452-53, 76 S.E. 954, 957 (1913). See
supra note 21.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
35. Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 165-69 (1929).
36. Star Piano Co. v. Burgner, 89 W. Va. 475, -, 109 S.E. 491, 492 (1921).
37. Cason v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 297, 24 S.E.2d 435 (1943).
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4:1(b)(3), when viewed in light of the above-stated legal principles,
indicates that materials will receive the qualified protection against
discovery provided by Rule 4:1(b)(3) if.prepared "in anticipation of
litigation." The next step of this inquiry, therefore, requires that
the meaning of "in anticipation of litigation" or, more specifically,
"anticipation" be analyzed.
In absence of any statutory definition a word is to be given its
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."8 As noted by the Su-
preme Court of West Virginia, there are four traditional tools to be
used to determine the meaning of a statutory word: contemporary
dictionaries, judicial pronouncements, reliable extra-judicial pro-
nouncements, and the legislative history of the subject statute.3 9
Turning to the first of these traditional tools, "anticipation" is
an "intuitive preconception: a priori knowledge: . . . formation of
an opinion before all facts are known.' 0 Similarly, "anticipation"
means "to consider in advance: give advance thought, discussion,
or treatment.'
41
Because the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia are promul-
gated by the Virginia Supreme Court, it is particularly helpful to
examine the court's use of the word "anticipate" in recent deci-
sions.42 In Harris v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,4' at issue was
38. Commonwealth v. Orange-Madison Cooperative Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261
S.E.2d 532, 533 (1980).
39. Pauley v. Kelly, - W. Va. ., 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979).
40. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 94 (1971).
41. Id. For Virginia cases which use derivations of the word "anticipate" in harmony with
notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text, see Coppola v. Warden of the Virginia State
Penetentiary, 222 Va. 329, 282 S.E.2d 10 (1981); Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. v.
Barker, 221 Va. 924, 275 S.E.2d 613 (1981); Kay Management Co. v. Creason, 220 Va. 820,
263 S.E.2d 094 (1980); Nicholaou v. Harrington, 217 Va. 618, 231 S.E.2d 318 (1977); Breeden
v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 227 S.E.2d 734 (1976); Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va.
123, 216 S.E.2d 60 (1975); India Acres of Thornburg, Inc. v. Denion, 215 Va. 847, 213 S.E.2d
797 (1975); Appalachian Power Co. v. Laforce, 214 Va. 438, 201 S.E.2d 768 (1974); Sager v.
Ortts, 214 Va. 318, 200 S.E.2d 539 (1973); Broaddus v. Standard Drug Co., 211 Va. 645, 179
S.E.2d 497 (1971).
Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) which found that an in-house study
can be a legitimate work product prior to any overt action by a prospective plaintiff signal-
ing that the prospective plaintiff contemplates an action against the preparers of the report.
Based upon various factors, the defendants in Upjohn had reason to believe that they
should anticipate prosecution or other action against them by the United States. Such antic-
ipation prompted the in-house study, and thus it was viewed by the Supreme Court as work
product.
42. Even though the language of the Virginia Rule is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3),
the Rule is the same only as far as consistent with Virginia practice. W.H. BRYsON, NOTEs
ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 111 (1979). Therefore, it is proper to construe derivations of
1983] 293
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whether recovery was permissible under a life insurance policy cov-
ering accidental death. Quoting Smith v. Combined Insurance Co.
of America, 4 the Virginia court said:
[I]t is generally held that if the insured voluntarily provokes or is
the aggressor in an encounter, and knows, or under the circum-
stances should reasonably anticipate, that he will be in danger of
death or great bodily harm as the natural or probable consequence
of his act or course of action, his death or injury is not caused by an
accident within the meaning of such a policy.45
The court went on to hold that the decisive issue was "whether
. . . Harris should have reasonably foreseen that his actions would
put him in danger of death or great bodily harm."46 Therefore, this
case indicates that the Supreme Court of Virginia views "anticipa-
tion" as synonymous with to "reasonably foresee." Such construc-
tion is readily seen in other Virginia cases as well.47
In determining whether a resultant act reasonably should have
been anticipated, the Supreme Court of Virginia has applied a ret-
rospective test;48 "looking at the consequences, were they so im-
probable or unlikely to occur that it would not be fair and just to
charge a reasonably prudent man with them. If not, he is liable. '49
In other words, the Virginia Supreme Court uses the "reasonable
man" test to determine whether subsequent matter was or should
have been foreseeable or reasonably anticipated. This is not an un-
workable test. Indeed, it already has been adopted by some
"anticipate" in a manner consistent with Virginia case law.
43. 222 Va. 45, 278 S.E.2d 809 (1981).
44. 202 Va. 758, 761, 102 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1961).
45. 222 Va. at 47, 278 S.E.2d at 810.
46. Id.
47. In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Patterson, the Court, in discussing forseeability, quoted
Hair v. City of Lynchburg, 165 Va. 78, 84, 181 S.E. 285, 287 (1935):
"One is bound to anticipate and provide against what usually happens and what is
likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility to hold him bound in
like manner to guard against what is unusual and unlikely to happen, or what, as is
sometimes said, is only remotely and slightly probable ..
204 Va. 81, 85, 129 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1963).
In Judy v. Doyle, 130 Va. 392, 403, 108 S.E. 6, 9 (1921) (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Whitehurst, 125 Va. 260, 263, 99 S.E. 568, 569 (1919)) the court stated: "'The "foreseeable-
ness" or reasonable anticipation of the consequences of a wrongful or negligent act ... may
be determinative of the question of his negligence.'"
48. Houston v. Strickland, 184 Va. 994, 37 S.E.2d 64 (1946); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. White-
hurst, 125 Va. 260, 99 S.E. 568 (1919).
49. 125 Va. at 264, 99 S.E. at 569.
294 [Vol. 17:285
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courts. 0
IV. APPLICABLE TEST TO BE USED TO- IMPLEMENT RULE 4:1(b)(3)
It light of the foregoing, the applicable test as to what consti-
tutes materials prepared "in anticipation of litigation" should be a
reasonable man test. If a reasonable man, in the shoes of the party
resisting discovery when the requested material was produced,
would have anticipated or reasonably foreseen litigation, the sub-
ject matter should receive the qualified protection of Rule
4:1(b)(3). This test should be applied even handedly to any and all
parties resisting discovery.
It can be argued, by detractors of this proposed test, that the
1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, mir-
rored in the Virginia Rules as applicable, were enacted so as to
50. Almaguer v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972) con-
cerned an accident to a railroad employee. There was only one witness other than the plain-
tiff. Two months before plaintiff hired counsel, the defendant's non-lawyer claim agent took
the written statement of the eyewitness as part of the routine investigation and in anticipa-
tion of a possible claim. After a lengthy quotation from and consideration of the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 497,
500 (1970), the court concluded:
I think it is fair to conclude from the Advisory Committee's Note and the cases cited
in it that statements taken by a claim agent immediately after an accident are taken
in anticipation of litigation .... The anticipation of the filing of a claim against a
railroad, when a railroad employee has been injured or claims to have been injured on
the job, is undeniable, and the expectation of litigation in such circumstances is a
reasonable assumption.
55 F.R.D. at 149. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that "[firom the nature
of the case, a death claim, State Farm's [insurance] agent could have reasonably concluded
that its insured would be sued. This was not the type of fender-bender case where a settle-
ment with the insured would likely occur without a lawsuit." Ex Parte State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co., - Ala. , 386 So. 2d 1133, 1136 (1980).
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island concurs:
In our litigious society, when an insured reports to his insurer that he has been in-
volved in an incident involving another person, the insurer can reasonably anticipate
that some action will be taken by the other party. The seeds of prospective litigation
have been sown, and the prudent party, anticipating this fact, will begin to prepare
his case.... The recognition of this possibility provides, in any given case, the impe-
tus for the insurer to garner information regarding the circumstances of a claim.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McAlpine, - R.I ... , 391 A.2d 84, 89-90 (1978). This
case purports to reject a case by case determination. Id. at , 391 A.2d at 89. But, in fact,
that is what it has done; and, in so doing, has laid the first stare decisis cobblestone which
will eventually present a defined, structured road over which work product litigation may
travel. See infra note 79.
Whether or not to compel discovery requires the courts to undertake a two step analysis:
1) Is it work product? 2) if so, has the party seeking discovery shown good cause? The
reader should note that this article primarily considers the first question. Many times the
answer to both questions will be yes and, therefore, work product .will be discoverable.
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make discovery easier. Therefore, a position, as asserted in this ar-
ticle, should not be adopted because it limits, rather than expands,
the new discovery rules. As applied to this particular problem, the
preceding argument is only a half-truth. It is true that the 1970
amendments were enacted so as to make discovery easier in gen-
eral. In order to do so, "good cause" was deleted from old Federal
Rule 34 which pertained to discovery of all documents and things.
The only "good cause" restrictions remaining were incorporated in
what is now Federal Rule 26(b)(3). However, the scope of the
work-product doctrine was expanded at that time. No longer did it
apply just to an attorney's work product, but it was extended so as
to apply to the work product of the parties and their agents.5 1
Therefore, while the 1970 amendments did make discovery, in gen-
eral, easier, they also expanded the scope of work product protec-
tion. The position asserted in this article merely is consistent with
the more expanded scope of the current work product protection.
The proposed test, for Virginia, is also consistent with the two
prongs of Hickman. One of the central purposes of Hickman v.
Taylor was that an attorney's thoughts 2 be protected. If an attor-
ney's work product is "open to opposing counsel on mere demand,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwrit-
ten."53 This is not a phenomenon singularly restricted to the prac-
tice of law. It has long been known and, therefore, held by the
courts in Virginia that fear of litigation will affect the way in which
a business will conduct its operations. If a corporation does not
make a full or honest investigation, or if it makes merely a self-
serving investigation, not only will the causes of the accident not
readily be identified or remedied, but also it is doubtful that truth
will be discovered in subsequent trials. The implementation of
Rule 4:1(b)(3), as written and as advocated in this article, recog-
nizes this fact.
The advocated implementation of Rule 4:1(b)(3) is also consis-
tent with the anti-indolence policy of Hickman. The object of any
trial is the discovery of truth. When the trial is conducted fairly
and properly, this objective is attained and the ends of justice have
been met." "[T]he ultimate objective of the adversary trial system
51. See supra notes 28-30.
52. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
53. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 511.
54. Leech v. Beasley, 203 Va. 955, 128 S.E.2d 293 (1962).
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and of pretrial discovery is identical." 55 The reason for this is that
justice can more likely be done if there is a preliminary determina-
tion of the truth of fact. As noted by the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, the fundamental reason why the adversary system works as
well as it does is that it contains built-in incentives to ensure that
the conduct of the participants favors greater investigation,
thereby enhancing the attainment of truth. Foremost among these
incentives is the motivation for winning the case, which fosters dil-
igence and industry on the part of the attorney.58
If this is true, in most, if not all, cases it should not matter who
supplied the work product in anticipation of litigation to the party
seeking to suppress discovery. Whether it is an attorney's work
product, a principal party's work product, or an agent's work prod-
uct, the result is the same. Hickman admonishes a party to pursue
diligently his own answers from "witnesses whose identity is well
known and whose availability... appears unimpaired. '57 This in-
deed is the position that has been taken by some courts. In dis-
cussing Hickman, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
Hickman is broader in sweep than merely protecting the work
product of attorneys.
For since, as the Court held, statements of prospective witnesses ob-
tained by a lawyer are not protected by the historic privilege inher-
ent in the lawyer-client relationship and are only protected against
disclosure if the adverse party cannot show good cause for their pro-
duction, we can see no logical basis for making any distinction be-
tween statements of witnesses secured by a party's trial counsel per-
sonally in preparation for trial and those obtained by others for the
use of the party's trial counsel. In each case the statements are ob-
tained in preparation for litigation and ultimately find their way
55. State v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 34 Wis. 2d 559, , 150 N.W.2d 387,
397 (1967).
56. In formulating rules concerning the discovery or nondiscovery of work product, a pri-
mary concern must be to preserve the lawyer's incentive to industry, the bedrock
principle of the practical working of our adversary system of jurisprudence. Any rule
which tends to diminish this incentive will necessarily diminish the aggregate investi-
gation of facts by lawyers. This, in turn, will lessen the efficiency of the rational deci-
sion-making machinery of our adversary system. Effective trial preparation must be
encouraged in order to enhance the prospects of an informed resolution of the contro-
versy. Accordingly, we shun any rule which would tend to encourage indolence or
laying back in pretrial investigation or which would tempt an attorney to unfairly
conceal the results of investigations they have made.
Id. at , 150 N.W.2d at 397.
57. 329 U.S. at 508.
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into trial counsel's files for his use in representing his client at trial.
The adverse party could certainly have no greater or different need
for copies of the statements in the one case than in the other. In
each case he has had the same opportunity through interrogatories
to learn all the pertinent facts which his opponent has gleaned from
the witnesses as well as the names and addresses of those witnesses
so that he himself may interview them or secure their depositions if
he wishes.""
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "we see no reason
to limit or modify the rule because the defendant is a corporation
and obtained its information and made its memoranda for the pur-
pose stated, through the usual agencies of a corporation." 59
58. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949). See also Note, Discovery
of an Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DuKE L.J. 799.
An interesting and related issue is whether parties responsibile for the preparation of
protected work product documents also are protected by Rule 4:1(b)(3) from disclosing,
through interrogations or other discovery means, the substantive details of such prepara-
tion. Rule 4:1(b)(3) is silent on this matter. It only talks in terms of a qualified protection
for "documents and other tangible things."
"[A] statute often speaks as plainly by inference, and by means of the purpose that un-
derlies it, as in any other manner. A policy that is clearly implied is as effective as that
which is expressed .... The statute should have a rational construction consistent with its
manifest purpose, and not one which will substantially defeat its object."
Leitner v. Citizens Cas. Co., 135 N.J.L. 608, _, 52 A.2d, 687, 690 (1947), quoted in Nor-
folk S. Ry. v. Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 364, 68 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1952).
Accord Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 114, 119, 135 S.E.2d 160, 166 (1964)
("We are required to give to the statute a reasonable construction - one which will, if possi-
ble give effect to its obvious purpose."); Bott v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Commission,
190 Va. 775, 783, 58 S.E.2d 306, 309-10 (1950), quoted in NAACP v. Committee, 201 Va.
890, 900, 114 S.E.2d 921, 929 (1960) (" '[W]e must consider the object of the legislation, the
purpose to be accomplished, and so construe it as to promote the end for which it was
enacted.' ")
The object of Rule 4:1(b)(3) is to qualifiedly restrict discovery of certain work products
prepared in anticipation of litigation. The purpose behind this objective, as discussed previ-
ously in this article, is to prevent parties from being deterred from the full and adequate
preparation for trial, to prevent counsel from coat-tailing on their adversaries, thereby re-
ducing the likelihood that all facts and law will be fully and adequately presented to the
court.
In light of this, Rule 4:1(b)(3) must be read as including within its ambit, interrogatories
to parties and other discovery tools which go toward their substantive input into protected
documents. This does not mean that one cannot ask "What happened on the night of the
24th?" but it does mean that one should not ask "What did opposing counsel ask you about
what happened on the 24th?" To hold otherwise would render negatory the objective of the
rule and frustrate its policies. Counsel should not be permitted to do indirectly that which
counsel cannot do directly. See, e.g., Dritt v. Morris, 235 Ark. 40, -, 357 S.W.2d 13, 17
(1962). ("[Such interrogatories have] the same effect as asking for statements made by wit-
nesses, and cannot be granted without a showing of necessity.").
59. Ex parte Shoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, -, 77 N.E. 276, 279 (1906).
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It is possible that there are persons who would complain that if
the courts adopted the position advocated in this article the "lit-
tle" litigants would be hampered, and the balance of justice would
be further weighted toward those with money. The basis for such
an assertion would be that once an accident occurred, any reasona-
ble major company would "anticipate litigation" and seal its in-
ternal files and investigations, thereby barring discovery. The fal-
lacy of this argument lies at its end. It has not been articulated
how reasonable discovery would be barred in the future. The work-
product doctrine does not seal files forever. Quite the contrary. It
encourages reasonable discovery. In fact, it bars all else. 0
The Supreme Court in Hickman noted that its rule did not lay
down an absolute work product privilege. Rather, the Court noted
that discovery could be held where production of information in
opposing. counsel's fies was "essential to the preparation of one's
case." 61 But the Court also noted that one must first show that the
information sought is unavailable through other means.6 2 This gen-
eral principle has been followed and fleshed out by subsequent
courts.
For example, in Alltmont v. United States,63 the Third Circuit
stated:
In other words he must show that there are special circumstances in
his particular case which make it essential to the preparation of his
case and in the interest of justice that the statements be produced
for his inspection or copying. His counsel's natural desire to learn
the details of his adversary's preparation for trial, to take advantage
60. As noted by the Hickman court:
There was only a naked, general demand for these materials as of right and a finding
by the District Court that no recognizable privilege was involved. That was insuffi-
cient to justify discovery under these circumstances and the court should have sus-
tained the refusal of the tug owners and Fortenbaugh [the attorney] to produce.
329 U.S. at 512.
61. Id. at 511. See also Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d
480 (4th Cir. 1973). In Duplan, the Fourth Circuit held that work product developed in one
suit maintains its classification as such in subsequent suits even though a new opposing
party is involved. In so holding the Fourth Circuit noted that "our decision will not in any
way frustrate the ends of justice. If the party seeking discovery can demonstrate the sub-
stantial need and undue hardship specified in the Rule and recognized in Hickman, the
district court will order production." Id. at 485 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 495. If a "little" litigant truly needs the information and cannot afford its sub-
stantive equivalent, this latter fact should be considered by the courts in determining
whether the work product is indeed unavailable through other means.
63. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
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of his adversary's industry in seeking out and interviewing prospec-
tive witnesses, to help prepare himself to examine witnesses or to
make sure that he has overlooked nothing are certainly not such
special circumstances since they are present in every case."'
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
[c]ompelling the production of documents under Rule 34 can be ex-
tremely harassing. Use of the weapon which this rule forges should
not be permitted without more than the easily satisfied test of rele-
vancy. This is particularly true since the identity of the witnesses
can be readily discovered by Rule 33 interrogatories. Opposing coun-
sel then has the opportunity to interview these witnesses himself or
to take their depositions. If it should subsequently appear that there
exists a special need to compel disclosure of the statements them-
selves, this would undoubtedly satisfy the required showing of good
cause.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally con-
strued, but they may not be expanded by disregarding plainly ex-
pressed limitations. We are not prepared to depart from the explicit
language of Rule 34 when viewed in the context of the entire discov-
ery section. In holding that a demonstration that the desired materi-
als are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation does not by
itself satisfy the good cause requirement of Rule 34, we are joining
every other Court of Appeals that has considered this question. 5
The Supreme Court of the United States cited Guilford Na-
tional Bank of Greensboro v. Southern Railway with favor in a
subsequent discussion of the good cause requirement in the federal
rules.6 6 In addition, this case was also cited by the Advisory Com-
mittee as representing the modern trend of cases interpreting
"good cause."'67 Furthermore, Guilford National Bank of Greens-
boro states the position subsequently adopted by the Supreme
Court of Virginia."' In construing a similar provision in Rule 4:9 of
64. Id. at 978; accord Gill v. Stolow, 16 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
65. Guilford Nat'l Bank of Greensboro v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 924-25 (4th Cir.
1962) (discussing the old Rule 34 wherein "good cause" was a necessary element when com-
pelling production).
66. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1964).
67. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-
ery, 48 F.R.D. at 500.
68. "One purpose of discovery procedures is to obtain evidence in the sole possession of
one party and unobtainable by opposing counsel through independent means. But more
than mere relevancy to the issue of the documents sought is necessary; the movant must
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the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court stated that
before any party is entitled to the production of documents, or
other tangible things, good cause must be shown. Consequently,
"there must be a showing of some special circumstances in addi-
tion to relevancy."' 9 It was this trend, not the one found in
Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba,70 that the
Advisory Committee adopted.7'
Keeping in mind the anti-indolence policies behind the work
product doctrine, it logically follows that it is insufficient merely to
allege that essential information will not be produced through
other discovery means; rather, an attorney should first exhaust all
other practical modes of discovery before requesting discovery of
opposing counsel's work product.72 The Supreme Court of Virginia
adopted a similar position, arguably in furtherance of the anti-in-
dolence policies: "Where both parties have an equal opportunity to
investigate, and where all the witnesses to the accident are known
and available to both sides, discovery should not be granted. '73
Consequently, the implementation of Rule 4:1(b)(3) proposed in
this article is consistent with the second prong of Hickman.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF A RECENT FOURTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
Virginia's pre-trial discovery rules are identical to Federal Rules
26 through 37 so far as is consistent with Virginia practice.74 Be-
cause state precedent is lacking, it is not unreasonable to assume
that a state court will look to its federal circuit for guidance. For
reasons set forth below, this author does not believe that Virginia
courts should follow the recent Fourth Circuit case, McDougall v.
Dunn.7 5
show good cause." Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 545-46, 172 S.E.2d, 751, 755 (1970) (citing
Guildord Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 923-24 (4th Cir. 1962)).
69. 210 Va. at 547, 172 S.E. at 756.
70. 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See infra for detailed discussion of case.
71. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-
ery, 48 F.R.D. at 500-02.
72. See, e.g., Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Cas. Co., 20 F.R.D. 223, 223
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("[P]laintiff's task will not be simple, but [that] do[es] not make the work
product of defendant's attorney available. Of course, if plaintiff, after diligent efforts, has
been unsuccessful, he is not precluded hereby from seeking production at a later date.")
73. 210 Va. at 547, 172 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Herrick v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 41 F.R.D.
51, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Koss v. America S.S. Co., 27 F.R.D. 511, 512 (E.D. Mich. 1960);
Dean v. Superior Ct., 84 Ariz. 104, 113, 324 P.2d 764, 770; 73 A.L.R.2d 1 (1958)).
74. W.H. BRYSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 111 (1979).
75. 468 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1972).
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The facts of McDougall indicate that the plaintiff sustained seri-
ous brain injuries, resulting in amnesia, while riding in the defen-
dant's car. As a result of his injuries, the plaintiff was in the hospi-
tal under treatment almost continuously for a year after the
accident. Furthermore, because of his amnesia, he did not remem-
ber the events surrounding the accident. Shortly after the accident,
the defendant's insurance carrier took written statements from the
three occupants of the car. It was not until almost two and one-
half years after the accident that the plaintiff employed counsel to
represent him in filing his own suit. During trial preparation, the
plaintiff moved to require the defendant to produce and to permit
the plaintiff to copy the statements of the defendant and the third-
party occupant taken shortly after the accident. The defendant re-
fused, claiming that he had a work product protection.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed that the state-
ments were taken "in anticipation of litigation. '7 6 "We are not at
all convinced that the statements demanded met the definition of
materials embraced within Section (b)(3) of Rule 26."' 7 The
Fourth Circuit cited two reasons in support of its holding: First,
the court stated that "[t]he statements sought for production were
secured by a claims adjuster of the insurance carrier of the defen-
dant more than two and one-half years before any claim was made
or suit begun or before the plaintiff had retained counsel. ' 17 8 The
logic behind reasoning based upon a time element is difficult to
accept.
If, upon viewing the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
man anticipates a suit, it only follows that he will commence prep-
aration for it. 9 For all practical purposes, most defendants have no
76. Id. at 473.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2023 (1970 & Cum.
Supp. 1981).
Prudent parties anticipate litigation, and begin preparation prior to the time suit is
formerly commenced. Thus the test should be whether, in light of the nature of the
document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be
said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.
Id. § 2024 at 198 (1970) (citing, in part, United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 45 (D.C.
Tex. 1979); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 81, 87 (D.C. Ga. 1979); Stix
Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfr's, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337 (D.C.N.Y. 1969); Ownby
v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 989 (D.C. Okla. 1968); Vilastor Kent Theater Corp. v. Brandt,




control over the timing of their potential adversary's filing. The
eventual timing of the adversary's action does not relate back to
the preparer's state of mind when litigation is first anticipated. If
one truly anticipates litigation will he sit passive for two years un-
til his adversary publicly files suit and challenges him to defend
himself? It seems highly unlikely. Pursuant to this logic, any plain-
tiff could wait until toward the end of the running of the applica-
ble statute of limitations of his case and thereby make his oppo-
nent's research discoverable. A plaintiff could easily document and
prove that his research or trial files were compiled in anticipation
of litigation since from the day of his injury, he knew he would sue.
To permit such an absurd practice would frustrate the anti-indo-
lence policies of the federal rule and the doctrine of Hickman v.
Taylor. Consequently, such a position is in direct conflict with the
purpose and policy of Rule 4:1(b)(3).
Relying upon Thomas Organ Co.,80 the McDougall Court pro-
vided its second reason:
This trend which was followed in the framing of Rule 26(b)(3)
compels the Court to conclude that any report or statement made
by or to a party's agent (other than to an attorney acting in the role
of counsellor), which has not been requested by nor prepared for an
attorney, nor which otherwise reflects the employment of an attor-
ney's legal expertise must be conclusively presumed to have been
made in the ordinary course of business and thus not within the
purview of the limited privilege of new Rule 26(b)(3) and (b)(4).8 1
The "trend" referred to is discussed in the Thomas Organ Co.
opinion:
[W]hen the Advisory Committee undertook the reorganization of all
discovery rules, the trend of the federal decisions had settled in the
direction of requiring the production of reports made by parties and
their agents in the regular course of business, i.e., not in conjunction
with or for an attorney (thus indicating such products were not con-
sidered to be work-product), although a showing of good cause in
the sense outlined in Hickman was still required for discovery of
trial preparation reports made by non-lawyers.82
80. 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Il1. 1972).
81. 468 F.2d at 473 (quoting Thomas Organ Co., 54 F.R.D. at 372) (emphasis in original).
82. 54 F.R.D. at 372 (emphasis in original).
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This language misses the thrust of the Advisory Committee's com-
ment. The Advisory Committee did not equate "regular course of
business" with "not in conjunction with or for an attorney."83
As noted by the Advisory Committee, prior to the 1970 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rule 34
required a showing of "good cause" for the production of all docu-
ments and things, whether or not trial preparation was involved.
The Advisory Committee further noted that within the "good
cause" requirement the courts had divided into two primary prac-
tices. For documents "not obtained or prepared with an eye to liti-
gation, the decisions, while not uniform, reflect[ed] a strong and
increasing tendency to relate good cause to a showing that the doc-
uments are relevant to the subject matter of the action."" On the
other hand, there was a growing trend to require more than rele-
vance for the production of trial preparation material. 5 Regarding
work prepared by non-lawyers, some courts ignored work product
and equated good cause with relevance, however, "the more recent
trend [was] to read 'good cause' as requiring inquiry into the im-
portance of and need for the materials as well as into alternative
sources for securing the same information.""6 The Advisory Com-
83. The Advisory Committee's words were as follows:
Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to the public
requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not
under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle,
Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone
Operators, Inc., 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962). No change is made in the existing doc-
trine, noted in the Hickman case, that one party may discover relevant facts known
or available to the other party, even though such facts are contained in a document
which is not itself discoverable.
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48
F.R.D. at 501 (emphasis added). This clearly indicates that materials prepared in the "regu-
lar course of business" are those materials unrelated to litigation or for noblitigation pur-
poses. Consequently, if an insurance adjuster regularly prepares reports in anticipation of
litigation his reports are not prepared in the "regular course of business" for purposes of the
above-quoted paragraph-the only mention by the Advisory Committee of "regular course
business." See, e.g., Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utilities Corp., - Del. Supr. _ - , 300
A.2d 12 (1972). "It continues to be the rule under the amended Federal Rules and the Dela-
ware counterparts that any document which was prepared in the ordinary course of business
and not in anticipation of trial is discoverable without any showing of need. . . ." Id. at 14
(emphasis added). Thomas Organ Co.'s reliance upon a "regular course of business" test
cannot be found in the humble paragraph quoted above. Nor can it be found-and, indeed,
is consistently refuted by-the rest of the Advisory Committee's comments.
84. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-





mittee then went on to say that
[s]ubdivision (b)(3) reflects the trend of the cases by requiring a
special showing, not merely as to materials prepared by an attorney,
but also as to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial by or for a party or any representative's action
on his behalf. The subdivision then goes on to protect against dis-
closure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories concerning the litigation of an attorney or other representa-
tive of a party.87
The language of the Advisory Committee is clear. It is difficult to
explain how the Thomas Organ Co. court could have missed or ig-
nored this clear language. The court in Thomas Organ Co. inaccu-
rately stated that the Advisory Committee followed a "trend" in
framing Rule 26(b)(3) which compelled the conclusion that
any report or statement made by or to a party's agent... which
has not been requested by nor prepared for an attorney nor which
otherwise reflects the employment of an attorney's legal expertise
must be conclusively presumed to have been made in the ordinary
course of business and thus not within the purview of the limited
privilege of new Rule 26(b)(3) and (b)(4).8
A primary fault of this premise, in addition to those discussed
above, is that it maintains that "in the regular course of business"
and "in anticipation of litigation" must be disjunctive. This is not
the case.89 Much or all of one's normal routine can be in anticipa-
tion of litigation. The language of the state and federal rule appear
explicitly to recognize this and make clear that those whose routine
business is in anticipation of litigation receive the same protection
as others.90 To hold otherwise merely serves to trample clear legis-
lative intent and to punish those who are prompt in their investi-
gations. Such punishment is, of course, contrary to the whole un-
derlying policies of the federal and state rules and Hickman v.
Taylor. Consequently, McDougall's reliance on the Thomas Organ
87. Id. at 502.
88. 54 F.R.D. at 372. A similar argument is set forth in Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipping & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
89. See supra note 83.
90. Both the federal and state rules are expressly made applicable to a party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, and insurer.
1983]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Co. interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3) 91 is misplaced. Unfortunately,
other courts have adopted this "routine business" distinction.92
More importantly, the "routine business test" fails to adequately
set forth the dividing line between materials prepared by an attor-
ney or at his direction pursuant to "routine business" and those
prepared "in anticipation of litigation.""' It delays the inevitable;
it restates the problem without setting forth a viable means of
resolving it. Obviously a demarcation must be made at some point.
The demarcation point cannot be after an action is instituted be-
cause at that time the documents would no longer truly be pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation, but, rather, commensurate with
pending litigation. This demarcation point, therefore, would have
to occur prior to the filing of a motion for judgment. This dilemma
is properly resolved through the careful weighing of all pertinent
facts to determine whether documents are indeed prepared "in an-
ticipation of litigation.". This, of course, brings us back to the
"test" which potentially weeds out all documents, routine or other-
wise, not prepared in anticipation of litigation. A specific "routine
document rule" coupled with an examination of relevant facts,
serves only to muddy the waters while adding no substance to the
test already advocated herein. The "routine document" test should
not be applied as an independent test.
At first blush it may appear that Virginia may have once fol-
lowed the routine document rule. In Robertson v. Common-
wealth,94 the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that
[a] statement made by an employee to his employer, in the
course of his ordinary duty, concerning a recent accident, and
before litigation has been brought or threatened, is not privi-
leged either in the hands of the employer or in the hands of
the latter's attorney to whom it has been transmitted. We so
91. 297 F.2d at 921.
92. See, e.g., Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592 P.2d 915 (1979).
93. Cf. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115 (N.C. Ga.
1972). The court expressed concern about permitting a rule which would insulate much of
the insurance industry from discovery. Therefore, it adopted the routine business rule test.
However, the court's legislative concern is not well taken.
An implementation of Rule 4:1(b) and (c) as adopted in this article might or might not
insulate much of the insurance industry from discovery. What is important, however, is that
it will not shelter information which is: 1) relevant; and 2) necessary. If information which is
not relevant and necessary is sheltered from discovery, wherein lies the harm? In fact, it is
arguable, that the greater harm to the legal system would be to permit forced discovery of
information which is neither relevant nor necessary.
94. 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
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held in Virginia-Carolina Chemical Company v. Knight, 106
Va. 674, 679, 680, 56 S.E. 725.95
However, if one looks at the history of this holding, it becomes
clear that this language is not dispositive on the routine document
issue. As cited above, the basis for the Robertson language is the
earlier case of Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Knight.98 In Vir-
ginia-Carolina Chemical Co., the Virginia Supreme Court stated:
It appears from the evidence of the cashier and chief clerk at the
defendant company that it is a matter of routine, whenever an acci-
dent occurs for the superintendent to report the accident to the
main office of the defendant, as we understand the evidence, and
that office sends the report to the insurance company which has un-
dertaken to indemnify the defendant. It appears that the report in
question was made by the superintendent of the Richmond Chemi-
cal Works, the place where the accident occurred in a branch of the
defendant company's works. It would, therefore, seem that the re-
port was made in the line of the superintendent's duty, which
would, if otherwise unobjectionable, render it admissible in evidence
against the defendant under the case of Lynchburg Telephone Co. v.
Booker, 103 Va. 594, 50 S.E. 148; see also Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Yopst, 118 Ind. 148, 20 N.E. 222, 3 L.R.A. 224; 1 Ellitt on Ev., Sec-
tion 225; 16 Cyc. 1019, 1023.97
Tracing back further to the Lynchburg Telephone Co. and
Western Union Telephone Co. cases, the courts discussed the issue
of whether an agent's statements are admissible against his princi-
pal as the principal's own statements. These holdings, therefore,
are simply matters of agency relationship exceptions to the hearsay
rule. Viewed in this light, the above-quoted language of their ulti-
mate ancestors is not dispositive of the "routine document rule"
issue.
The Robertson court, however, went further and qualified the
admissibility of an agent's hearsay statement against his employer:
A statement concerning an accident which is obtained by the em-
ployer from his servant for bona fide purpose of being later trans-
mitted to the employer's attorney for advice, or to be used by the
attorney in connection with pending or threatened litigation as
95. Id. at 539, 25 S.E.2d at 360.
96. 106 Va. 674, 56 S.E. 725 (1907).
97. Id. at 679, 56 S.E. at 727.
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privileged."
The court cited, among other cases, Davenport Co. v. Penn-
sylvania Railroadee for this proposition. In Davenport Co., a con-
ductor's accident report was not discoverable, even though it was
made before institution of litigation. The court found that the re-
port was prepared "so that if suit was brought it might be placed
in the hands of counsel to guide them in making defense."100
It is true, however, that the report was made after the prospec-
tive plaintiff sent a letter to the prospective defendant. The advent
of the letter apparently put the litigation situation into one of
"threatened" litigation.101 "Threatened or pending" litigation was
the old standard. This aspect of Robertson has been overruled, in
part, by Rule 4:1(b)(3) which now incorporates an "in anticipation
of litigation" standard. As noted above, Robertson and Davenport
Co. indicate that in-house accident reports become "privileged"
when made for threatened or pending litigation. Rule 4:1(b)(3) has
extended the nature and quality of the time in which such reports
can be made with resulting limited protection. Pending litigation
presumably meant that the action had been commenced.
Threatened litigation presumably meant that there was a require-
ment of some overt act by the prospective plaintiff, other than the
accident itself, which signaled to the prospective defendant that a
suit was being "threatened." In Davenport Co., a letter by the pro-
spective plaintiff apparently satisfied this condition. Now, because
of Rule 4:1(b)(3), the focus is on the "anticipated litigation"
standard.
As previously discussed, this new focus contemplates a reasona-
ble man standard. It contemplates consideration of all the facts
which a person in the shoes of the prospective defendant would
weigh in determining whether or not subsequent litigation is rea-
98. 181 Va. at 539, 25 S.E.2d at 360. Virginia, therefore, like Hopkins v. Chesapeake Util-
ity Corp., - Del. -, 300 A.2d 12 (1972) and unlike Thomas Organ Co., 54 F.R.D. 367
(N.D. Ill. 1972) and McDougall, 468 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1972) has not historically held that
one's routine business materials cannot be limitedly protected when prepared for bona fide
purposes of anticipating trial. Therefore, although the language is the same, the judicial
purposes and policies behind the Virginia and Fourth Circuit rules are divergent.
99. 166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895).
100. Id. at -, 31 A. at 246.
101. As cited in the text, Robertson enunciated a protection for an agent's statements




sonably foreseen. With this limited modification of Robertson,
Robertson, read in light of Davenport Co., is on all fours with the
position advocated in this article.
Consequently, upon analysis, the two-tiered foundation of
Thomas Organ Co. crumbles, and Thomas Organ Co. is not good
law. Because Thomas Organ Co. is the foundation for the McDou-
gall decision, Virginia should not look to McDougall for guidance.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the interpretation of Rule 4:1(b)(3) advocated in this arti-
cle, reasonable discovery would remain. The proposed implementa-
tion of Rule 4:1(b)(3) asserts that as a matter of public policy it is
in the best interest of the courts, the justice system, and the ascer-
tainment of truth, for each party to prepare its own case as thor-
oughly and as completely as practicable. When such preparation is
insufficient so that a party's interest will not be represented thor-
oughly and fully, then, and only then, should one be entitled to dip
into the work product of an adversary. If it is determined that one
does, in fact, need the work product of another, there is nothing in
the advocated interpretation which bars discovery.
Further, the test advocated by the author is in line with the pur-
poses and policies of Hickman v. Taylor, our notions of justice and
fair play in the adversary system, and the Virginia rules of statu-
tory construction: It would give effect to clear, statutory language;
it would ensure whole and adequate preparation; it would provide
for discovery of work product materials when needed for the ade-
quate representation of a client. The test also would prevent judi-
cial legislation in writing into the rule a prescriptive clause
designed to punish those who have established mechanisms which
enable them to promptly investigate accidents. Hair-splitting as to
which organizations are to be penalized under the liberal reading
of the Rule would be obviated by the test, which is consistent with
the comments of the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court.
Therefore, it should be adopted and applied by the circuit courts
in Virginia.
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